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Foreword 
 
Never before have the Romanian government and public waited so excitedly the 
publishing of the regular European Commission country report. The suspense is 
justified by the fact that Romania is the last among candidates not to have yet 
received the status of ’functional market economy’. There is now less than a year to 
go until the presumed end of negotiations, in the fall of 2004. Romania still has 11 
acquis chapters open, and many of the 19 provisionally closed were concluded 
without a sustainable policy of implementation being adopted or even discussed. If 
Romania fails to end negotiations by end 2004, the EU’s calendar makes it highly 
implausible that she will meet the 2007 target. As we approach the end of 2003 the 
time has come to ask if these dates are realistic. This year was no better and no worse 
than any other. If things get more heated, it is because Romania’s usual pace of 
reforms is no longer good enough when she carries the legacy of past delays and the 
deadline nears every day. What are the chances that the delay is recuperated in the 
next year, and that an increased speed in negotiations is matched by an equal 
commitment to implement the acquis?  The task is not impossible: Slovakia in its last 
year of negotiations had a comparable delay, and it met the target. But Romania 
has always lagged behind Slovakia in political will.  
The Romanian economy has grown well in the last years and the trend is still positive. 
In the same time the perception of corruption in the economy as captured by the 
index of Transparency International has not decreased, despite packs of legislation 
against corruption passed in the last two years. It is in this contradiction that the main 
dilemma of the Romanian economy can be found. A great part of the economy 
definitely operates as a market economy and would deserve an upgrade. But it is 
equally clear that parts of the economy have ended up in the property of predatory 
elites, which managed to hijack privatization to their profit.  
This also happened in the countries accepted by the European Union this year. How 
substantial is the share of the economy which depends on state capture in order to 
survive and which would not be competitive once Romania would join, as it could no 
longer enjoy eternal rescheduling of bad debts, preferential contracts and credits? In 
our view this is the essential question on which the appreciation of Romania as a 
market economy should rest upon. Romanian newspapers are full of names of these 
privileged entrepreneurs. But how much of the economy is infested with this gray 
network syndrome? Clearly the phenomenon cannot be so widespread, or the 
macroeconomic Figs would not look so good as they actually do. In the same time 
some indirect indicators, such as the level of arrears, remain a source of concern.  
What is clear is that the answer to the question cannot be given on purely economic 
grounds. The main source of corruption in Romania is politics. 
The first part of this report would therefore review the progress made in the crucial 
field of governance, such as reform of public administration, political process, 
judiciary and corruption fighting. In the second, economic section the arguments are 
then reviewed in favor and against an upgrade of the Romanian economy. Romania 
is discussed in this report by comparison either with Central European countries which 
have already managed to join, or with Bulgaria, its partner in the 2007 accession 
target, which in 2002 was declared a functioning market economy. Finally, 
recommendations are made to improve the prospects of Romania’s EU accession.  
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I. GOVERNMENT 
 
 
SLUGGISH PROGRESS ON GOVERNANCE 
REFORM 
 
1. Corruption and Political Process 
 
The Romanian political system has always been less competitive compared 
to the other accession countries. Romania had the most belated political 
swing in the region as late as 1996, and she is the only country in the 
accession process to have had three postcommunist governments out of 
four full cabinet terms after 1989. The Fig tells more about the 
competitiveness of the political system – the difference in skills and 
resources between postcommunists and anticommunists – rather than 
about voters. If one compares Romania to first wave accession Poland, for 
instance, the best comparison match (large population, high number of 
peasants) one is stricken by the resemblance of the electoral patterns in the 
two countries. The difference was considerable in early ‘90s, due to 
exceptional circumstances (Romanian postcommunist party ran in 1990 not 
as successor of Communist Party) but it has narrowed down since 
considerably. If Poland does better than Romania, the blame can be laid 
on four reasons: 
? For the health of economic reforms it seems now that it was better to 
start the transition with an anticommunist government; at the times 
Poland was engaged in shock therapy and attracted investors Romania 
was still struggling with democratization issues, such as miners’ riots, 
usefullnessusefulness of property restitution, and so forth. 
? For the sake of accountability it appears better to have regular rotations 
in power once in four years. The Polish anticommunist coalitions were as 
squabbling and divisive as the Romanian ones, but the swing 
nevertheless acted well to prevent any political actor to gain a major 
advantage and capture the state. 
? Polish former Communist party was a lot more market-friendly and 
certainly acted better on property issues than Romanian postcommunist 
party (FSN, then FDSN, then PSDR, then PSD). The Polish party reformed 
early and eased fears from the first time when it returned to government 
by acting decisively as a market friendly organization.  
? Romania is the only accession country where the an anti-system party 
(Greater Romania Party, PRM) has reached such good electoral scores 
(Fig. 1) 
 
The Romanian 
political system 
is the least 
competitive in 
the region 
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Fig. 1. Comparing political competitiveness of Romania and Poland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Electoral competition between incumbent and challenger elites 
 
% ELECTION 1 ELECTION 2 ELECTION 3 ELECTION 4 
Poland postcommunist party 12 20 27 41 
Poland anticommunist party   34 5.6 
Romania main postcommunist 
party 
(66) 28 21 37 
Romania anticommunist party  20 30 5 
Romania anti-system party (PRM)  3.9 4.5 19.5 
 
Under these circumstances, the creation in September 2003 of an alliance 
of the two main opposition parties, the Democrats (PD, led by Traian 
Băsescu) and the Liberals (PNL, led by Teodor Stolojan) is positive news. 
Together, the alliance can defeat PRM, the radical populist party of 
Corneliu Vadim Tudor, in local elections. Although the current decision of 
the two parties is to run separately in local elections and on joint lists in 
general elections only, their alliance is still too recent and was achieved in 
spite of too much internal opposition to consider such early hints as 
definitive commitments. Considerable capacity building is also still needed 
for the alliance to be able to win elections and govern well, but the first step 
was taken. A rotation in power in 2004 would not jeopardize European 
accession, but may prove the only way to unseat the gray economy 
networks (more about this in the Economy section). The political system is 
now more balanced due to the existence of a stronger opposition. Even the 
government party will benefit from a stronger opposition, shaking it from the 
current state of complacency. Its domination in the last two years seems to 
have been counter-productive for its declared goal of internal reform and 
creation of a modern social-democratic party. As the comparison with 
Poland shows, what Romania lacks is high-quality political elites, both in the 
postcommunist and the anticommunist camps, because; otherwise, 
constituencies the public for both is in both countries are quite similar. 
Comparative surveys confirm that the Romanian voters are no less 
democratically oriented and its citizens as critical towards the state as their 
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12
20
66
28
41
27
37
21
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Election 1 Election 2 Election 3 Election 4
%
Poland Romania
P O L I C Y  W A R N I N G  R E P O R T  −  O C T  2 0 0 3  
 
 
7 
Central European counterparts. Overall political trust is extremely low, but 
not below the regional average. Courts and Parliaments enjoy little or no 
trust, but if one compares again Romania with Poland one finds no 
significant difference (Fig. 2-3). Clearly the difference in performance rests 
with the elites, not the public. 
Fig. 2. Political trust in institutions (%) in accession countries 
                                              Parliament         Parties          Courts          Police 
Bulgaria   26  25  24  31 
Czech Republic  20  21  34  40 
Poland                20   8  15  21 
Hungary   16  14  36  29 
Romania               13   9  19  36 
Slovenia   10   8  26  24 
Estonia                 10   8  26  30 
Lithuania                  9   8  16  19 
Latvia                   8   7  24  27 
Slovakia    8   9  15  26 
(New Europe average) (14)  (12)  (25)  (28) 
Source: New Europe Barometer (2001) 
 
Fig. 3. Preferences for undemocratic alternatives  
            Communist            Military             Dictator 
                                                                                                  (% regarding as better) 
 
Slovakia                                                   30   3  25 
Bulgaria                                                   27  132  28 
Slovenia                                                  23   6  27 
Poland                                    23   6  33 
Czech Republic                                                 18   1  13 
Romania                                   19  14   32 
Hungary                                                  17   2  17 
Lithuania                                    14   5  40 
Estonia                                     8   2  40 
Latvia                                     7   4  38 
(New Europe average)                                  (18)   (6)               (29) 
Source: New Europe Barometer (2001) 
Public opinion does not differ much from country to country. But the quality 
of political elites and the accountability mechanisms are clearly lower in 
Romania than they should be. Political migration reached a scale that is no 
longer comparable with Central European countries, not to mention 
established democracies. Even the spokesperson of the government party 
in Romania belonged to a different party barely a year ago. In the same 
situation are many ministers, Romania’s main representative in the 
European Convention, and so forth. Parties grow when in government and 
shrink after losing office by orders of magnitude. As MPs are elected on 
party lists, and therefore the constituency votes for the party rather than the 
person (the Fig of voters who cannot name their local representatives is very 
high), this practice is twice infamous. First, because every politician 
The problem is 
the poor 
performance of 
elites, not the 
general public 
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becomes a potential client, which and that corrupts politics completely; 
second, because they violate the result of elections, depriving vertical 
accountability of any meaning. The situation is no better in the case of 
mayors, although they are directly elected, as they switch party frequently, 
usually in favor of the government party or its satellites (Fig. 4). The usual 
claim is that such a move provides better access to government grants. In 
fact the theory that constituencies fare better after their mayor switches 
party is yet to be tested. 
 
Fig. 4. Political migration  
Parties Mayors since last elections MPs since last elections 
 2000 2002 2000 2002 
PSD (govt) 1050 1584 210 227 
APR 284 79 -- -- 
PRM 66 53 121 108 
PNL 251 262 43 40 
PD 483 407 44 37 
CDR 147 116 -- 1 
PUR 32 64 10 7 
Independents 159 90 -- 11 
 
Once corruption starts from the top, it is difficult to argue that fighting petty 
bureaucratic corruption is a worthy cause – or even a feasible one in an 
environment of growing cynicism. Romanians are highly skeptical that the 
new agencies created to fight corruption are impartial and do not protect 
people in power.1 Other qualitative aspects also reduce the effectiveness 
of political process and the governing performance, thus pushing 
Romania’s democracy scores below that of other accession countries. 
Comparing again with Poland, Romania is rated by Freedom House on the 
average three times worse on the main items of quality of democracy, 
political process, media, governance, corruption and justice. 
Fig. 5. The quality of democracy in Romania and Poland 
 
                                                                          
1 SAR-CURS survey, August 2003. 
Year Political Media Governance Corruption Justice
POL 1.50 1.50 1.75 -- 1.50 1997 
ROM 3.25 4.25 4.25 -- 4.25 
POL 1.25 1.50 1.75 -- 1.50 1998 
ROM 3.25 4.00 4.00 -- 4.25 
POL 1.25 1.50 1.75 2.25 1.50 1999-2000 
ROM 3.25 3.50 3.50 4.25 4.25 
POL 1.25 1.50 1.75 2.25 1.50 2001 
ROM 3.25 3.50 3.75 4.50 4.25 
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Businesspeople and experts seem to agree in their assessments on 
corruption, and here Bulgaria scored above Romania in the last years2. This 
year Romania passed a stuffy anti-corruption package, but due to constant 
scandals in the media about top corruption cases, and the spectacular 
ineffectiveness of law enforcement agencies to nail at least once a political 
entrepreneur close to the government, the perception did not improve. 
How can it, when the largest advertising campaign of the year, the 
campaign for the referendum on the Constitution, was commissioned 
without any tender to an agency favored by the government? And it Public 
perception will not improve in the future just as a result of passing legislation. 
People want facts, not additional interpretable and wordy laws. 
The revision of the Constitution is a missed opportunity for a reform of the 
political system. After years of debate, all the proposals with a real potential 
to change something did not pass through. The final result is that the 
Constitution will bring no improvement in the separation of powers, no 
increase in the effectiveness of the two chambers, no raise in the quality of 
MPs. A deadline of 45 days was introduced to avoid delays between the 
two Chambers, but as no part of the chain was eliminated this risks only the 
impeding further the already low quality of legislation passed. Even the 
much praised change of wording at articles regarding protection of 
property and the rights for the Hungarian minority are redundant at the 
best, if not hypocritical. The Constitution did not prevent a better treatment 
of property, nor did it forbid the use of minority languages in Courts with a 
translator, and if these practices were not encouraged it was because of 
lack of political will, not the Constitution.  
 
 
 
 
2. On Justice 
 
The situation of property restitution remains the best example. While putting 
in the new Constitution that property would not be nationalized in the future 
– an unlikely possibility in view of Romania’s EU accession – Romania fights 
daily (and loses) in the European Court in Strasbourg not to return 
nationalized property. All the extraordinary appeals against owners are still 
pending: the newly-appointed General Prosecutor made no sign to he 
intends to backtrack on this issue. While the Constitution was voted and this 
report went to print, the Supreme Court of Justice ruled in an extra-ordinary 
appeal that not even a building confiscated by the Red Army without any 
papers and then passed in the property of the Romanian state – still without 
papers – can be returned to the former owners.   
The gap between what the government says and what it does is nowhere 
more obvious than in the field of judicial reform. Here 2003 was the crucial 
year, when all the four laws making the new framework of the organization 
of judiciary should have been enacted, as well as the criminal code, 
procedure of criminal codes and a new fiscal code. As Fig. 6 shows, though 
some progress was made, the results are below expectations, and thus the 
                                                                          
2 See Transparency International Index of Corruption 2001, 2002; also Freedom 
House Nations in Transit scores 
The new 
Constitution: a 
step forward, but 
also a missed 
opportunity 
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conclusion of the Home and Justice Affairs acquis chapter was postponed. 
No decision was taken on the two most important issues, which can bear an 
influence on the crucial topic of political intervention – at least none known 
to the wider public. After the Constitution is amended the Supreme Court of 
Justice will be replaced by a ‘Court of Cassation’. The current judges will 
serve until their limited tenure ends. By what mechanism will be used to 
appoint the new judges?  
Normally, the Supreme Council of Magistrates (SCM) should nominate them, 
as the elected body empowered by the new constitution to ensure the 
independence of judiciary and manage the career of magistrates. But how 
would the Council be appointed to insulate it from political intervention? 
The mechanism introduced last year through an emergency ordinance was 
not good and unsurprisingly failed to make this new body autonomous. The 
composition one proposed by the new Constitution is not so different, 
making the President (representative of the executive branch) chair the 
Council. The Council also keeps prosecutors in, who are directly 
subordinated to the Ministry of Justice, and care was taken that the 
President of the Supreme Court remain fairly weak so it cannot compete in 
any way with the Minister of Justice. Even the election of member judges 
members of SCM is entrusted only to superior Courts, conditioned by 
seniority and a PhD, so diminishing further the chances of post-1989 judges 
of being elected. On top of all these, there is a final screening by the 
Parliament, where by tradition there is little bargaining but rather majority 
imposition. Also the Parliament, therefore the majority, gets to appoint two 
members of civil society, lowering further the number of direct 
representatives of judges. It is now clear that even if a formal transfer of 
power is made from the Ministry of Justice to the Supreme Council, it will 
make little difference in practice. The will to democratize the judiciary and 
allow the large whole professional body to have a say in the election of 
SCM is so far missing. 
The resistance in the field of judiciary reform is quite formidable. It should not 
be blamed on the Ministry of Justice only. Lawyers who dominate the 
judicial committees of both chambers had practiced many years under the 
Communist regime, when admission to Law Schools presupposed the 
screening of family files. What can be more conservative than this group of 
aged persons ruling over their profession, socialized in Communist times? 
The situation of high Courts, also because of age barriers at the entrance, is 
only slightly better. Drawing on this restricted community in order to start a 
revolution is a nearly impossible task. There is no critical mass in favor of 
change, and grassroots challenges by judges from ordinary Courts, 
unhappy with their social standing and low pay, have been repressed so 
far.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judicial reform 
– a large gap 
between 
words and 
deeds 
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Fig.6. State of the art in state reform, end 2003 
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reuniting all government control 
agencies after govt restructuring 
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capacity of govt 
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came after months of public scandals 
Conflict of interest when 
disbursing public funds, as well 
as European funds, remains 
mostly unregulated.  
Most drafts to complete reform of 
justice now ready after revision of 
the 2000 ‘Stoica’ package  
None of them passed yet, two crucial 
drafts on Public Prosecutor and the 
nomination mechanisms of Supreme 
Council of Magistrates (CSMSCM) not 
public yet and Supreme Court still not 
public 
Last year reorganization of CSM SCM 
failed to remove judiciary from 
political control (‘Florea’ scandal) 
 
New magistrates statute draft 
keeps strong Ministry of Justice, 
but as CSM SCM in the current 
form is also subject to political 
influence, this does not change 
much 
General Attorney Joita Tanase, 
champion of extra-ordinary 
appeals, resigned 
Appeals still go on in property trials 
under his successor 
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Top government leadership unwilling 
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making process. 
Inflation of poorly-conceived laws is 
likely to continue. 
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3. Public Administration Reform 
 
Romania scores last among EU accession countries on the World Bank 
composite index of governance quality – an average of six scores 
measuring accountability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, 
rule of law, control of corruption, and political stability – falling behind a 
non-accession country like Croatia (see Fig 7). But more important, Romania 
witnessed the smallest improvement in performance between 1998 and 
2002 from all the states included in this group. This is concerning, especially 
since part of the rise is explained by one of the six indices (political stability). 
The findings confirm that the low grades Romania got in the past from the 
EU Commission in the annual country reports on public administration reform 
are not entirely subjective or politically motivated.  
There is ample evidence today that sustainable growth is heavily 
dependent on the quality of governance in a particular country. One of the 
most recent and complete such evaluations, conducted on 175 states, 
aggregating the main cross-country measurements produced by various 
organizations, reports a strong and positive causal link between the quality 
of policies and administration on the one hand, and economic 
performance on the other3. But even more interesting, the authors report a 
weak and negative causation running in the opposite direction, from per 
capita income to governance, after the first positive effect is controlled for.  
In other words: 
• good governance leads to growth and prosperity; 
• but economic growth and greater prosperity do not by themselves 
bring about good governance – on the contrary, sometimes they 
can encourage misgovernance. 
These conclusions have significant policy implications, especially in 
countries like Romania. Waiting for the time to pass and solve the problems 
of misgovernance as the society gets richer does not work. Actually it may 
even aggravate them, since greater wealth only raises the stakes of the 
social transactions, without changing their nature, and increases the 
pressure of rent-seeking, state capture and bureaucratic corruption. “When 
the institutions of the state are captured by vested interests in this way, 
entrenched elites can benefit from a worsening of the status quo of 
governance and can resist demands for change even as incomes rise.” (op 
cit).  
The first and the following sections of this report documents with data that in 
some transition countries – Romania included – something like this may be 
happening. When economic growth does not translate immediately into 
higher public satisfaction, support and legitimacy for the new democratic 
institutions, this may be a symptom that it is not associated with better 
government. And if all these ingredients are missing, the economic 
performance risks to become unsustainable in the long run.  
                                                                          
3 D. Kaufmann and A. Kraay, 2003. Aggregate Governance Indicators 1996-2002, 
www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance  
Good 
governance 
leads to 
economic 
growth – but the 
reverse is not 
necessarily true 
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Since good governance is not a “luxury good” to which a country 
automatically graduates when it gets richer, it means that reforms in this 
particular area should be regarded as a separate goal which must be 
pursued with specific strategies. Although there is no specific acquis 
communautaire on public administration reform, the topic has gradually 
climbed at the top of the agenda of the EU-Romania relationship in the last 
years, a development reflected in the annual country reports. Approaching 
this subject is difficult, as the area of public administration reform (PAR) is 
hard to measure for monitoring purposes. However, a consensus emerged 
that PAR should advance on three main directions: 
a. Decentralization. Real decentralization means the existence of sub-
national tiers of elected government, with their own legitimacy and scope 
of decision-making. A good process of decentralization presupposes a 
clear assignment of (i) attributions, and (ii) sources of revenue, by tier of 
government. If decentralization is to be something more than window-
dressing, the relation between central and local governments has to be 
defined through iron rules protecting the area of exclusive local autonomy. 
The shared resources have to be allocated according to transparent and 
non-negotiable criteria. 
b. Civil service reform, including the fight against bureaucratic corruption. A 
professional, politically neutral and stable bureaucracy must be created 
which is able to carry out the daily routine of public service delivery and 
assist the political decision-makers with quality technical advice. Although 
in general this has been considered a “fuzzy” area of post-communist 
reforms, since progress is harder to quantify than in, say, privatization, a 
number of dimensions can be identified on which it is possible to built 
indicators which can be afterwards monitored: entry in the civil service must 
be open and competitive; there should be regular performance 
evaluations (where not everybody will end up with the highest grade) 
which feed into the payment and promotion systems; civil servants should 
Fig. 7. Trends in the quality of governance 
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be insulated from illegitimate political pressure; a fair institutional process 
should exist for disciplinary action; the average training level should rise in 
time; civil service positions should be attractive, which means a certain 
proportionality should be maintained with private-sector salaries; a good 
database should exist with complete data on civil service salaries, as a 
management instrument for the government; the total wage bill should be 
affordable and transparent, while the sector-specific arrangements and 
discretionary fractions of salaries should be reduced to a minimum.  
c. Policy process reform, including issues of transparency and 
accountability. Policy formulation in a modern administration ensures that (i) 
the top cabinet meetings are managed in a way that allows it to focus on 
strategic objectives rather than being burdened with details of legal 
drafting; (ii) there is a system of sub-committees of the cabinet to 
coordinate a number of broad policy areas and screen new proposals 
before they reach the plenum – in typical EU countries about 90% of such 
arbitrage takes place at this level of sub-committee review; when this is 
done, (iii) important measures are first presented to the cabinet as short 
“policy options papers” outlining the main problems, trade-offs and 
solutions; draft laws are produced only afterwards, when the hard choices 
are explicitly made. A proper consultation with the main stakeholders 
should be organized during the stage of discussing policy options. Policy 
implementation assumes that subordinated institutions should be given 
clear mandates, freedom to manage themselves and be held 
accountable for results.   
In brief, the core philosophic principles at the heart of PAR are the 
separation and delegation of powers. Essentially, it is all about the gradual 
and orderly withdrawal of the central political power from (a) local 
community affairs and (b) daily routine bureaucratic work. In the released 
space new institutions and accountable processes have to be inserted, 
many of which will be newly-created and involving other, non-political 
actors (c). The public sector institutions should become accountable 
primarily to their clients – the broader public – and only subsequently to their 
superiors. As a rule, all the relevant information produced in a public 
organization for reporting and management purposes, whether financial or 
non-financial, should be ex oficio available to the public in a meaningful 
form. 
 
What has been done since the previous country report? 
A number of actions were taken by the Romanian government in the past 
year in an attempt to address the deficit of PAR and improve its scorecard 
in view of the 2003 country report.  
• A comprehensive Anti-Corruption Law was adopted in April. In fact this 
was a package of laws including, among other things: the assets and 
interests disclosure requirements for top dignitaries and civil servants; 
measures to enhance the anti-corruption institutional framework; and a 
new law of the civil service to replace the old one passed in 1999. This 
law attempts to define better the scope and status of the civil service in 
Romania, and raises the threshold in the process of depoliticization by 
transforming a number of top appointed positions into a special class of 
“high civil servants” (for example, the office of prefect).  
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• A “sunshine law” came into effect which opens up the decision-making 
process in public institutions to public consultation and participation. The 
scope of the e-procurement system, set up a few years ago, was 
broadened. The new Constitution (if approved in the referendum) would 
also slightly constrain the ability of the government to pass emergency 
ordinances. 
• There was a government reshuffle-cum-restructuring in June, which 
reduced the number of Romanian ministries from 24 to 14 (however, 
some of them survived as central government “agencies”). The 
restructuring was accompanied by a staff reduction, but clear and 
complete data in this respect were not offered.  
• A sub-committee of the cabinet was set up, made up of eight ministers, 
for dealing specifically with public administration reform issues (IMCAR). 
Its members are supposed to meet roughly once a month. IMCAR has a 
permanent secretariat – the Central Unit for Public Administration Reform 
(CUPAR) – located in the new Ministry of Administration and Internal 
Affairs.  
• A comprehensive exercise of consultations with the public institutions 
and various non-governmental actors was initiated in August, under the 
coordination of CUPAR. It consists of a series of workshops organized in 
various locations in Romania where the public organizations’ 
representatives are supposed to bring and discuss their sectoral 
strategies for reform. All the inputs will be integrated into a consolidated 
strategy of the Romanian government, which should be ready by 
December and represent the basis for further steps in PAR.  
• The National Institute for Administration (INA) was shaped up, particularly 
since the new law of the civil service creates a legal obligation for every 
civil servant to attend at least 7 days of professional training per year. 
Moreover, the “young professionals” program was initiated with the 
objective of recruiting 500 young people educated abroad and place 
them on a fast-track career of “euro-councilors” in all the ministries and 
central government agencies.  
• A number of foreign assistance programs were initiated, financed by EU, 
World Bank or bilateral donors, aimed at providing resources and 
technical expertise into the process of public administration reform. Most 
notably, there are important funds being currently pumped into central 
administration streamlining, professionalization of certain functions (for 
example, the prefect), assisting INA and the National Agency for Public 
Servants to understand and carry out their new duties, or increasing the 
capacity of local governments.  
 
Stumbling blocks in the public administration reform 
However, it is questionable that all this legal and institutional frenzy will have 
a significant impact on reality. Among the three areas presented above, 
decentralization is probably the one in which most progress was made prior 
to 2001, though also one of the least well understood. By and large, a 
reasonably functional system of local governance was created through 
successive legislative acts (1991, 1994, 1998, 2001). All that was needed was 
Decentralization 
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adjustment at the margins, for example by better clarifying the functions of 
local and county councils, spelling out the further steps in the reassignment 
of attributions and revenues in order to stabilize expectations, and refining 
the criteria for resource allocation passed down from ministries through 
counties to localities.  
But first of all, what was needed was a strong determination to enforce the 
existing legislation. This has been utterly missing. Laws are ignored, 
interpreted creatively or openly broken in order to perpetuate the old 
pattern of patronizing and subordinating the lower tiers of government. In 
their turn, those local governments with the right political connections 
cherish this loose environment where there are no hard budgetary 
constraints and everything is negotiable on a case-by-case basis. Certain 
financial allocations are made in defiance to the State Budget Law in order 
to build political networks in territory (the equalization sums). Others are not 
only discretionary but also opaque, so it is hard for independent observers 
or the public to see where the money went and why (infrastructure funds). 
The new Civil Service Law requires that the office of prefect will become a 
professional “high civil servant”, with all the limitations and protections of 
such a position. True, the provision was not meant to apply immediately, the 
implementation being phased over a period of a few years. However, only 
months after the law was adopted and following the government 
reorganization in June, a number of prefects were reshuffled. Some were 
blamed not for ineffectiveness as prefects, but as local party organization 
leaders. The former prefect of Bucharest, a military judge, was replaced by 
a straight two-star retired general. These developments raise a question 
mark, not over the speed or details of decentralization reforms, but on its 
very direction. 
If this is the situation with decentralization, the other two areas of PAR look 
even worse. Overall, the same general impression is conveyed that laws are 
passed in order to check boxes in the matrices of conditionality imposed by 
international organizations, while they make little impact on reality. The 
previous Civil Service Law, adopted just in time for Romania to be admitted 
to start EU negotiations at Helsinki in 1999, was no obstacle against 
politically-motivated reshuffle of the public sector when a new government 
came to power. In some cases only the name of institutions were changed 
as a pretext for “reorganization”. It is unlikely that the current version will 
have more teeth. The monitoring of compliance in such sensitive areas as 
civil service reform should follow not only the passing of legislation, but also 
carefully constructed indicators such as turnover rates after a change in 
leadership (overall, and by institution).  
The same problem with the transparency laws: there are no clear 
consequences if someone is found to have filled incomplete data in the 
assets- or interest-declaration forms. The case of a senator, recently 
exposed by the media as having been in conflict of interest, convey the 
impression that sanctions are negotiable and depend on the political 
affiliation of the perpetrator. There is a clear need here that the 
government follows up the passing of legislation with resolute action which 
sends a signal to everyone. Otherwise, non-enforced EU-compatible laws 
will continue to accumulate and contribute to the legislative Potemkin 
village erected by the authorities, in the heroic effort to build the new 
Romania. 
Laws are passed 
just to check 
boxes, or as a 
substitute for 
real action 
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Some changes are well-meant, but half-baked and as a result may have 
unforeseen consequences. The legal obligation that each of the 110,000 
civil servants from the central and local administrations should take at least 
7 days of training per year creates an annual public liability estimated to 
about 40 mil USD. The level exceeds by far the current supply of training on 
the Romanian market; government officials have admitted that INA can 
cover about 10% of the demand, at best. Besides these short-term trainings, 
INA should also offer long-term graduate programs in public administration. 
It has been slow to organize itself, but eventually managed in the fall of 
2003 to select and dispatch the first class of students in a British university for 
one academic year. This is good – but the danger lays elsewhere: having 
adopted the French ENA as a model, the Romanian INA is unlikely to 
replicate anytime soon ENA’s strengths (top class education, esprit de 
corps), while it is very probable to replicate its weaknesses (closeness, boys-
club mentality, preference for deals based on informal personal 
connections, including across the public-private border). All these will only 
reinforce existing shortcomings in the Romanian civil service, and probably 
add exotic flavors to the original model due to the specific Balkan context 
where it is transplanted. A more open and competitive admission in the civil 
service, by removing the “preferential” treatment of INA graduates, would 
both make the environment more transparent and dissipate the impression 
that this is just another party cadre school.  
The young professionals initiative is also one that should be scrutinized very 
carefully. Their performance will depend very much on the environment 
and the system of incentives in institutions. It is true that in general the 
Romanian public administration badly needs young people who can work 
on PCs, manage projects and speak foreign languages. However, most of 
them will stay only as long as they feel they can make a difference, and 
lose motivation when they see that they don’t. It may seem hard to believe 
but there are currently cases in the central government of young people 
returned from abroad and working in top positions without being formally 
employed. They stay many months in a row on these unpaid internships and 
work hard in the hope that their engagement will eventually be formalized. 
The situation is unusual, but illustrates the point that some individuals come 
with motivations that are more purposive than financial, and that there is a 
supply of qualified labor at least for some sections of the civil service. If the 
turnover remains high, this shows that there are other reasons than the low 
pay which drive good people away.  
In general, the management of the civil service remains amateurish, 
fragmented and discretionary. Obscurity is used by employees as a cover 
for incompetence – or worse. There is little institutional memory in 
organizations. By default they remain secretive, and the public information 
is hidden from the public as the only comparative advantage of otherwise 
unemployable civil servants. The National Agency of Civil Servants is too 
weak politically to perform effective horizontal screening during the 
recruitment process. As their representatives admit, they cannot impose 
anything on strong ministries, which continue to be run as independent 
feuds – sometimes they cannot even collect the information they are 
mandated to collect, such as those referring to salaries. The newly 
introduced annual evaluation does not rank the employees according to 
their actual performance since everybody gets the highest grades. As a 
Low payment 
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result the bonus payment system is regarded as a discretionary supplement 
to a wage which is anyway too low to be an incentive for performance.  
In fact, there is no unitary civil service in Romanian yet – all we have is a 
collection of sectoral and opaque bureaucracies, run by a mismatch of 
sector-specific arrangements around which powerful vested interests have 
solidified in time. This establishment is not only unmanageable, but even 
hard to understand, and the government has shown little appetite for 
tackling the core of the problem so far. The effort to develop a database 
and a system of indicators to assess the current situation has been going on 
for some years, with donors’ help. However, the Agency is sometimes 
reluctant to even develop measurements of output and outcome, partly 
because nobody has done this before, partly out of fear to step on 
somebody’s toes. 
Which leads to the natural conclusion that substantial civil service reform, 
and PAR in general, can only be done if there is a firm commitment at the 
top. The cabinet leadership should be willing to spend some political capital 
on painful decisions – which include staff reductions, but not only. 
Delegating unpleasant tasks to junior ministers is not going to work, as they 
cannot reform the departments run by their powerful senior colleagues. Until 
now this level of determination at the top has missed, and we have to see if 
it will be present from now on.  
The process of decision-making remains protracted, being ambushed in 
various points with draft laws which flow continuously from ministries and 
agencies, sometimes hitting each other with competing versions of the 
same draft. Instead of being short, focused and reaching clear decisions, 
Romanian cabinet meetings are long and have unpredictable agendas. A 
lot of time is spent on irrelevant details, while crucial choices either pass 
unnoticed or are avoided on purpose. When this happens, the hard 
decisions are postponed indefinitely, and therefore taken implicitly by the 
bureaucracy in the process of implementation. This is why many times the 
administrative norms that follow a law are more important than the law itself 
– actually, they make law.  
There is currently little chance to slow down the flow of ill-considered 
legislation rushed through because “reforms are urgent”, which quickly 
prove inapplicable and are followed by new and even more urgent bills to 
amend the first. In other instances the drafting and passing of laws has 
become a substitute for real action in Romania, a way to avoid confronting 
the reality. Donors have come to realize that this is a problem and 
sometimes explicitly ask the Romanian authorities to allow more time for 
debates and discuss the key issue openly, in order to increase the quality of 
acts and regulations. However, this is difficult, since there is no clear 
counterpart on the domestic side in change with this issue. No focus for 
coordinating policies has emerged so far, and the civil service has no 
experience in costing out laws, evaluating their broader social impact and 
assisting the decision-makers with such expertise. Like in CS reform, there is 
little chance that such a policy-coordination system will appear as long as 
the top political leadership does not realize the importance of the problem 
and is willing to spend some political capital on fixing it.  
The consultations organized by public authorities – whether they are 
required by the new sunshine law or part of broader strategies, such as the 
Public 
administration 
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one led by the Ministry of Administration and Interior on public 
administration reform – are likely to be in the end just formal exercises 
carried out in order to show some action or please the international donors. 
There is usually no conceptual preparation of these initiatives, no structure 
and no channel to feed the outputs, whatever they are, into the real 
decision-making process.  
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II. ECONOMY 
 
 
 
 
THE ELUSIVE ‘FUNCTIONAL MARKET 
ECONOMY’ 
 
1. Economic criteria for joining the EU 
Aspirant countries to EU accession are asked by the EU Commission in 
Brussels to comply with two fundamental requirements: to have a so-called 
“functioning market economy”; and to withstand competitive pressures 
inside the economic/monetary union. The first requirement – “the existence 
of a functioning market economy”4 – connotes an institutional setup (the 
functioning of basic market institutions) which ensures effective financial 
discipline, easy market entry and exit, proper contract enforcement and 
protection of property rights, and an adequate policy mix framework, with 
mechanisms to deal with adverse shocks which are reasonably effective.  
The second requirement refers to the reduction in scope for the national 
economic policy in a region with a common monetary policy. EU accession 
means joining a club where, among other things, intra-trade barriers will no 
longer exist, there is a single currency in 12 member countries, and, in a 
softer form, the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM2) constrains exchange 
rate policy in the other states significantly. Both requirements are seen as 
essential for enhancing nominal and real convergence, without which the 
Union would be undermined from within. 
 
2. Why is it important for Romania to get the status of functioning 
market economy? 
The transition countries to be admitted in 2004 were granted the status of 
“functioning market economy” a few years ago; Bulgaria received it in 
2002. This upgrade of our southern neighbor’s, and the debate on Turkey 
and other would-be accession countries, have raised the stakes for 
Romania in a race which becomes ever more challenging in view of the 
economic and geopolitical circumstances which accompany 
enlargement.  Being left behind in a race which has its own symbols 
(specific criteria, diplomatic language and cryptic qualifiers, not always 
transparent to outsiders – such as that of functionality in the “functioning 
                                                                          
4 A “functioning market economy” is quite curious terminologically; this notion 
cannot be found in economic textbooks, since all market economies are 
functioning, whether well or poorly. What the experts in Brussels have, most likely, in 
mind is a “well functioning market economy”, which relies on a sound institutional 
setup and low information and transaction costs. 
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market economy”) can harm one country’s credentials. As a result, it is easy 
to understand that in Romania this issue has a lot of political capital 
attached to it. On the other hand, rushing to join the Union at any cost can 
be self-defeating. The laws of economics cannot be bent beyond certain 
limits without threatening the very ultimate goal (accession).  
Nevertheless, if the next wave of enlargement does not proceed smoothly, 
Romania would have to show increasingly better results in order to justify her 
quest to join the EU, as the inner political and economic dynamics in the 
Union make another round of enlargement unlikely any time soon.  
 
3. Where does Romania stand? 
Do basic market institutions exist and do free prices play their role in 
allocating resources in Romania? By and large, they do. In a broad sense, 
Romania already has a “functioning market economy” and her 
performance has improved substantially in recent years. Significant 
problems remain to be tackled such as the poor financial discipline, weak 
enforcement of market regulations, low transparency and stability of the 
regulatory framework, the inefficient public administration and judiciary. 
Nonetheless, some progress has been made on all these dimensions in 
recent years. Moreover, since some leading EU economies have a hard 
time in meeting the Maastricht criteria, the question could be raised if is it 
sensible to be over-strict with accession countries. 
Romania has inherited huge structural problems, and as a result faces a 
number of dilemmas and constraints in reforming its economy. They appear 
as a series of trade-offs:  
• low budget deficits which should help disinflation while there is need for 
public financing of badly needed large infrastructure projects; 
• manageable current account deficits and further disinflation (plus 
exchange rate appreciation), against the backdrop of minimal trade 
protection, which could overwhelmingly put the burden of adjustment, 
primarily, on budget policy; 
• productivity growth and subdued short-term welfare gains (wages grow 
slower than productivity in order to retain the labour costs-driven 
competitive advantage) while prices grow anyway (because they were 
initially below world levels). 
• free movement of capital flows and interest rates cuts, which may strain 
the balance of payments while capital account liberalisation proceeds 
further; 
• the current type of competitiveness (based on wage differential) vs. the 
innovation-driven type of economies, to which Romania is trying to 
converge (Romania’s spending on research and development is seven 
times lower than the Lisbon target of 3% of GDP).  
It should be stressed, nonetheless, that some of these policy dilemmas and 
resulted trade-offs do not concern Romania only; other candidate 
countries, which are to join the Union in 2004, need also make painful 
decisions.  
 
Romania alredy 
has a market 
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3.1. What speaks in favor of an upgrade?  
There are economic arguments which support an upgrade if Brussels’ 
implicit criteria are to be consistently applied. 
• Economic recovery has been under way for several years now; the GDP 
grew by 5.7% and 4.9% in 2001 and 2002, respectively. It would, 
probably, rise by around 4.5% this year; the current deceleration would 
be, due, primarily, to fallout from economic stagnation in the West and 
a bad domestic harvest. For 2004 a forecast of 5% is reasonable in view 
of an expected revival in EU economies, the growth of domestic non-
governmental credit, a further rise in domestic investment, and, 
hopefully, a better harvest.  
• Inflation, the big scourge of the past decade, has been coming  down 
consistently: from 30.3% (Dec. on Dec.), in 2001, it went down to 17.8% in 
2002, and would, likely, drop to around 14% this year; it is forecast to go 
further down to about  9% in 2004.  
• The overall public indebtedness has stayed below 30% of GDP, out of 
which the external public and publicly guaranteed debt is cca ¾, while 
short term indebtedness is pretty low (below 5% of total foreign debt). 
• Budget deficits have been kept under 3% in recent years. Albeit 
significant quasi-fiscal deficits blur this assessment, it is encouraging that 
they have shown a tendency of decline lately. Current account deficits 
have been kept, on average, around 5% in recent years while the 
international reserves of the Central Bank have surged to almost 7 billion 
euro in September 2003 (which covers more then 4.7 months of imports). 
• The private sector’s contribution to GDP formation is nearing 70% 
currently, while this sector accounts for over 55% of social capital in the 
economy and more than 70% of employed population.  
• The banking system is much sounder nowadays, after a massive clean 
up operation in the late ‘90s and the introduction of a new regulatory 
framework that fits the BIS new recommendations. This evolution has 
taken place on the background of increasing foreign ownership in the 
banking sector (to above 60% of total assets and loans), which has 
ameliorated corporate governance in this sector. Recently, Banca 
Comerciala Romana, which is the largest commercial bank, has got IFC 
and EBRD as new share-holders. Banks are on the average better at 
providing effective intermediation between savers and investors. Both 
the active and the passive interest rates have decreased substantially, 
and the spread between them also diminished (Fig. 4). Likewise, the 
range of financial products has increased remarkably and led to a 
boost of non-governmental credit. 
• Some structural reforms (including privatisation) and a more effective 
budget (tax) policy administration have been implemented recently. A 
good part of the privatization commitments undertaken in the PSAL I 
and PSAL II programs with the World Bank are reasonably on track: 
companies with a history of loss making, such as Tepro Iasi, Tractorul and 
Roman Brasov, and ARO have just been sold.  
• A new fiscal code is to be adopted by the Government until the end of 
this year, and a special unit for large taxpayers has been established in 
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Bucharest in a move to strengthen tax administration. New legal 
framework has been created to unify the collection, audit and 
enforcement of the social security funds under the supervision of the 
Ministry of Public Finance.  
• Market access procedures have been simplified. Registration and 
authorization have been simplified by setting up a one-stop-office, and 
a silent approval procedure was introduced. In order to facilitate market 
exit, a legislative project on bankruptcy and reorganisation procedures 
has been initiated, aiming at increasing the ability for creditors to file for 
bankruptcy. 
• State aid and competition. Romania is currently applying the EC criteria 
in the authorization of new state aids, and is monitoring the existing aid 
with the goal of bringing it in line with the acquis. However, the issue of 
arrears, discussed in the following sections, questions the progress in this 
direction.  
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• The annual yield for T-bills, which was a major attraction for banks’ 
investment policy, decreased from 76% in 1999 and 35.7% in 2001 to 
17.3% in 2002 and 15.5% as of August 2003. This evolution has provided 
another stimulus to domestic non-governmental credit, which has 
boomed by a 25%, in real terms, in the first half of 2003. It is noticeable 
that despite this big rise prudential indicators are still in safe territory. 
Lately, the Central Bank has adopted a series of measures aiming at 
restraining the upsurge of this credit –as a sort of preemptive policy. 
• The non-financial sector has also developed rapidly, and the best 
indicator in this regard is the market capitalization of the Bucharest Stock 
Exchange: from 1.04% of GDP in 1999 and 3.3% of GDP in 2001, it has 
climbed to 6.05% of GDP in 2002 and 7% of GDP in the first half of 2003. 
Fig. 4. Key prudential indicators in the banking system 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Jul 
Solvency rate (>12%) 17.9 23.7 28.8 25.0 22.8 
Bad loans, as % of total assets 2.36 0.29 0.32 0.23 0.42 
Credit risk rate 35.4 3.8 2.5 1.1 3.9 
Source: NBR Monthly Bulletin 7/2003 
 
2.2. How does Romania fare comparatively? 
It is instructive to compare the current state of the Romanian economy with 
the situation in other EU candidate countries when they received the status 
of “functioning market economy”. The data in the tables below are 
comparable in most respects. If the same standards operate in the 
judgement of economic performance, Romania can be given serious 
consideration for an upgrade. One could argue that judgements evolve 
over time and that they are more severe nowadays in view of recent years’ 
developments both inside and outside the Union. This is not an argument to 
dismiss out of hand; on the other hand, how can one reconcile such a line 
Fig. 3. Active  and passive  inte rest rates, commercial banks
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of reasoning with, for instance, recent years’ balooning budget deficits of 
some countries which are to join the EU in 2004?   
Fig. 5. Private sector’s share in selected accession economies 
 Private sector, % GDP Private sector, % employment 
 1997 2001 1997 2001 
Hungary 65* 80   
Poland 60* 65 65* 70 
Bulgaria  71*  73* 
     
Romania  67  70 
* At the time when it was declared a functioning market economy 
Source: OECD and World Bank data 
 
Fig. 6. Key macroeconomic indicators, selected EU candidate countries, at 
the time the European Commission considered them “functioning market 
economies” – as compared to Romania before the Commission’s 2003 
Country Report 
 CZ  97 HU  97 POL  97 SK  00 BUL   02 RO  03 
GDP,% annual real growth  1.0 4.4 6.9 2.2 4.8 4.8 
(proj) 
Inflation rate, % Dec/Dec 10.0 18.3 13.2 8.4 3.8 14 
(proj) 
Unemployment rate, % 5.2 8.1 10.3 17.9 17.4 6.6 
(Aug 
03) 
Current account deficit, % GDP -6.1 -2.2 - 3.2 -3.7 -4.4 -4.8 
(proj) 
Budget deficit, % GDP -2.2 -4.6 - 3.1 -6.7 -0.6 -2.7 
(proj) 
Gross foreign debt, % GDP 41 63.1 28 37.3 71.9 33.0 
(end 
02) 
Official gross foreign reserves, 
in months of imports 
4.9 5 5.9 3.7 5.3 4.7  
(Sep 
03) 
M2, % GDP 67.3 39.4 38.2 66.0 43.3 24.7 
(end 
02) 
Note: all projections for Romania are those of the Government, and are endorsed by the 
latest IMF country analyses.      Source: European Commission, IMF, national statistics 
There are countries which have registered sharply deteriorating economic 
indicators (budget and current account deficits) in the last couple of years, 
quite ahead of their forthcoming year of accession, in 2004 – for instance: 
Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic. During this period Romania’ economic 
performance has visibly improved. This state of affairs has not been 
unnoticed by the main rating agencies, which have improved Romania’s 
standing during the spring of 2003. Most recently, Standard and Poor’s 
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raised it to BB. Romania’s rating is still under investment grade, but prospects 
for further positive revisions are deemed fairly high5.  
Fig. 7. Latest economic data from selected EU candidate countries  
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Fig. 8. Credit ratings, Standard & Poor, countries’ sovereign fixed income 
long term debt, as of October 1st, 2003 
 Local currency Foreign currency 
 Rating Evolution Rating Evolution 
Romania BB+ Positive BB Positive 
Bulgaria BBB- Stable BB+ Stable 
Czech Rep. A+ Stable A- Stable 
Cyprus A+ Stable A Stable 
Hungary A Stable A- Stable 
Lithuania A- Stable BBB+ Stable 
Poland A Negative BBB+ Negative 
Slovak Rep. A- Stable BBB Positive 
Other indicators, capturing the deep structural characteristics of CEE 
economies, also offer an interesting view, as on many dimensions Romania 
is not necessarily the outlayer. Labor costs as a share of per capita GDP 
revolves around the regional average, unlike in a few other countries where 
they appear to be unsustainably high (Fig. 9). The large agriculture sector is 
indeed inefficient, but not more than Poland’s – in this respect Bulgaria fares 
                                                                          
5 Analysts from leading investment banks consider that, in spite of these upgrades, 
rating agencies continue to underrate Romania’s performance (“Sovereign Eastern 
Europe Update, Bear and Stearns, 26 June, 2003) 
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indeed better than the other two countries, while in Hungary the agriculture 
is virtually as efficient as the rest of the economy (Fig. 10). The energy 
consumption per one dollar of GDP, a fair measure of the advance in 
restructuring a post-communist economy, is lower in Romania than in 
Bulgaria, though higher than in other CEE countries which have moved 
faster towards energy efficiency (Fig. 11). And the deviation from the world 
prices expressed by the purchasing power parity (how much more similar 
goods one can buy in one particular country with 1$ than in USA) also show 
that Bulgarians face the longest way until they catch up with the rest of the 
world (Fig. 12). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         
 
 
 
 
Fig. 10. The efficiency of the agricultural sector 
 Ro Bg Pol Hu 
Agriculture, % employed 42 27 18 6.2 
Agriculture, % GDP 15 13 5.1 6 
Agriculture efficiency: GDP 
share/employment share 
0.36 0.48 0.28 0.97 
 Source: IMF 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 9. (Un)sustainability of the annual average wage
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Fig. 11. Power consumption per unit of GDP, 2001
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Fig. 14. Starting a business 
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Fig. 12. The purchasing power parity, 2001
(an average measure of the deviation of domestic prices from world prices)
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Fig. 13. Difficulty of contract enforcement
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The overall picture emerging from these comparisons is therefore more 
nuanced than that offered by the annual reports of the Commission. 
• There is a heavy burden of rural underdevelopment in Romania and 
Poland, with Bulgaria performing surprisingly better in this respect. 
However, in Poland agriculture and the pension system appear to be 
used less than in Romania as safety valves against unemployment.  
• Privatization has advanced faster in Bulgaria than in Romania, especially 
since the current government took over in Sofia. In combination with the 
tight monetary policy of the currency board, it has led to the current 
perception of better macro stability and reformist drive. The latest move 
by Bucharest to privatize some loss-making companies, after years of 
feet-dragging, is probably too recent to have trickled into the regular 
reports of international observers. 
• By contrast, the alignment to world prices seems to be more advanced 
in Romania than in Bulgaria. Most probably, this is the case with energy 
prices that were liberalized faster in Romania. As a result, the Romanian 
economy appears to be more energy-intensive today, though still 
behind those of the first-wave countries.  
• The business environment has improved in Romania lately, at least on 
the indicators measured by World Bank and reported in a recent study: 
contract enforcement seems to be no more difficult than in other 
“market economy” countries; while starting a business has become 
relatively easy and cheap (Fig. 13-14).  
 
2.3. What clouds the sky? 
Romania’s economic track record after 1999, when the country fended off 
the threat of a Bulgarian-style crisis, is very patchy, however. As already 
mentioned, major weaknesses persist which could harm GDP growth and 
macroeconomic conditions unless reforms go on. This caveat does not refer 
to unavoidable business cycle related fluctuations, but to an imaginable 
relapse into a combination of revived inflation and balance of payments 
difficulties. The current poor financial discipline and the unfriendly 
investment climate in Romania have been repeatedly stressed by observers 
as risk factors, and a number of government initiatives were aimed at 
improving things lately.  
• Inflation is still high and has in the past been used by many companies 
as a means to survive. The current disinflation puts pressure on the loss-
making sector and, in absence of bolder restructuring, large quasi-fiscal-
deficits would clobber the budget in the years to come. The persistence 
of these deficits would question the suitability of moving fast with the 
liberalisation of the capital account and the adoption of inflation-
targeting in the near future. Although adding quasi-fiscal deficits to the 
official public budget deficits has its own methodological flaws – this is 
how the actual “consolidated” public deficit is measured most of the 
time – ignoring or underestimating them would be a serious mistake.  
• Related to the point above, financial (including fiscal) discipline is not 
enforced consistently and loss making companies produce sizeable 
arrears / quasi-fiscal deficits. This is especially the case in their 
relationship with the energy sector, where the losses amount to about 
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1.5-2% of GDP. Arrears (losses) are also significant in the petrochemical 
industry. Also concerning is the fact that the arrears generated in 
transactions between private agents are on the rise and soon will 
overcome those generated by the sate sector, which was predominant 
in the early ‘90s (Fig. 15). It is true that the total arrears declined in real 
terms lately, including in the energy sector, and the budget deficit has 
been capped at 3%. However, these goals should not be achieved by 
hiding twice the amount of the deficit in various dark corners of the 
economy, as the director of World Bank mission in Romania recently 
pointed out. He estimated the current quasi-fiscal deficit to around 2-3% 
of the GDP, an unsustainably high level, and argued that the problem is 
kept under the lid since no official data are published on these issues 
and the public is not properly informed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• In spite of the recent improvements in the business climate mentioned 
above, red tape and corruption remain major concerns. What is more, 
while all the recent measures look impressive on paper, the changes for 
the better in the actual investment climate hinge fundamentally on how 
all these normative acts and regulations will be enforced – for 
enforcement is, like in other transition economies, the critical element in 
fostering real change. 
• The pension system is increasingly under strain. The system is 
unbalanced, with much of its financing coming from the health 
insurance’s budget, a fact usually denied by the government. The 
problem is chronic, because the retired population exceeds in number 
the employees (the ratio is nowadays 3:2, as compared to 1:2 in the 
early nineties). Public authorities seem only now to move closer to a real 
reform, after the abolition in early 2001 of the private pension laws 
adopted by the previous government. The accumulating of hidden 
deficits in the pension system, in parallel with a low and steadily 
declining employment rate, is not good omens for a would-be market 
economy. 
Fig. 15. Enterprise payment arrears, %GDP
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The real 
danger: the 
para-legal 
network 
economy 
developed by 
predatory 
elites 
• In the energy sector Petrom, the national oil company, is slowly 
advancing towards privatization, and so are two branches of the 
national electricity provider and two gas distribution companies. 
However, the general perception is that too little is done, and too late, 
as the government will soon enter the last year of its mandate. True, the 
energy sector poses specific problems because it needs large 
investments, while the interests of potential investors have to be 
reconciled with the protection of numerous low-income individuals. 
Moreover, as the experience worldwide indicates, energy markets need 
effective regulation, for market failures can be especially damaging in 
this area. But none of these arguments can be an excuse for foot-
dragging and letting state energy companies become suppliers of soft 
credits, like the banks which eventually went bust six or seven years ago.  
• The same bold reforms are also needed in the mining and railways 
sector. When the fourth and final instalment from the current agreement 
with IMF was approved in October, thus completing the first of six such 
agreements since the fall of communism, the result was achieved only 
with four important waivers included. The general impression was that 
Romania has gasped over the finish line rather than run a brilliant race.  
• There are also important “legacies” of delayed reforms from PSAL 
program with the World Bank, such as the unfulfilled promise to sell BCR, 
the largest Romanian bank, and CEC, the savings bank. It is true that the 
lack of interest from strategic investors made the privatization slow and 
difficult. But whatever the reason, this is another point on which Romania 
compares defavourably with Bulgaria, which has fully privatized its 
banking sector and insulated it from political intervention. As things 
stand PSAL II can only be concluded by rolling over the “legacies” into 
the new PAL program currently negotiated with the Romanian 
government.  
The problems highlighted in this brief analysis cannot be dealt with rapidly, 
since most of them are structural. Some of them do not even pertain to 
Romania only; they loom large in other accession (and not only) countries 
as well. For instance, agriculture has already strained Poland’s accession 
negotiations; likewise, the crisis of the pension (welfare) systems shows up 
increasingly in all accession countries and in the Euroland, too.  
What is specific to Romania, however, is the rapid growth in the last years of 
a para-legal network economy which came to represent a substantial 
share of the private sector. Its core consists of a group of powerful 
businesspeople who have built their companies either as startups or, more 
often, in the privatization process, using political connections. In this sense, 
they are more political than economic entrepreneurs. The lists of companies 
high on public debt published by the Departament of Finance after public 
pressure contains almost all the big names of Romanian business with huge 
sums. The difference between independent entrepreneurs and state 
captors is easy to be traced in their treatment, also published by 
Department of Finance: the former are forcibly pursued, the latter have 
their debts ‘rescheduled’. The latter includes Corneliu Iacobov, the brothers 
Micula, Tofan Group, and practically all the private electronic media. What 
would remain of these fortunes and businesses had they finally need to 
settle their debts? Some of these people have been directly involved in the 
privatization process before becoming fully private: one can notice 
 R O M A N I A N  A C A D E M I C  S O C I E T Y  ( S A R )  
 
 
 32 
immediately that after they take over a state owned enterprise its 
performance does not get any better – and sometimes gets worse. Such 
entrepreneurship explains in part the increase in arrears generated by the 
private sector (Fig. 15). Second, their influence goes much beyond the 
actual share of assets they own in the total economy, since these people 
have become trend-setters. Their success and impunity encourage every 
entrepreneur to try to emulate such successful role models. Various 
industries such as oil refining and retailing, constructions, tourism or agro-
businesses have been partly captured by the para-legal network economy, 
but other sectors suffer too. Their influence is so strong that even in those 
rare occasions when infringements of laws are blatant and widely known to 
the public – as it happened recently when football clubs, mostly owned by 
the same group of people, were found that they did not pay any tax or 
social contributions towards the lavish salaries of their players, and frankly 
admitted it – the authorities cannot muster enough courage to act, apply 
penalties and recuperate the debt. 
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Trivial but 
visible petty 
criminality 
shape 
Westerners’ 
perception of 
Romanians 
and Bulgarians
 
III. Social 
 
MIGRATION: FEARS ARE EXAGGERATED 
 
Western media abounds in horror stories about Romanian migrants who 
trespass local residence rights, work in the black economy, and form 
criminal networks, engaged in stealing, prostitution or beggary. These stories 
are readily taken over by the Romanian media, which usually emphasize 
the Roma ethnic origin of many of the culprits. This game has been going 
on for a number of years, but recently the situation has taken a turn for  the 
worse, with separate media reports that the French and Austrian 
government respectively are considering the re-introduction of visa 
requirements for Romanian citizens. While officially denied, these rumours 
have nevertheless stirred anxiety in Bucharest, and the matter was raised 
during the visit of the Romanian Home Secretary to his French counterpart.   
 
 
(Illegal) Migrants 
 
Romania was the last CEE applicant to have visa restrictions lifted in 2001 by 
Schengen countries. The decision came only after the newly elected 
Romanian government had convinced the European partners of its ability 
to secure the external borders, and reversed the prior government’s policy 
by accepting the repatriation of asylum seekers expelled from Germany. 
The benign impact, in terms of migrant inflow, of abolishing visas for 
Bulgarian citizens one year before has also smoothened the course for the 
decision on Romania.  
However, problems showed up pretty soon. After visa restrictions were lifted, 
the number of Romanian adults travelling abroad in 2002 was only up to 5% 
higher than in 20016. However, media reports presented a much worse 
situation of Romanians working in the black economy, at times under the 
control of criminal gangs. Romanians became also involved in human 
trafficking, comprising prostitutes (mostly women, but also men), children, 
and lately disabled (employed for begging). Another widespread criminal 
activity consisted of networks of thieves, robbing shops and storages and re-
selling the products in Eastern Europe.  
While the number of people involved was not extremely high, prostitution 
and begging are visible activities for the media. However, there are also 
reports of large migrant communities in midsize towns, engaging in 
organized crime, and having a strong influence over the local authorities – 
                                                                          
6 Romania, Annual Early Warning Report, 2003, Romanian Academic Society, 
http://www.sar.org.ro/pwr  
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e.g. Castellon, in Spain, where the Romanian community numbers as many 
as 10,000 people.  
The situation appears to have reached a crisis point in a number of EU 
member states. The Austrian home affairs secretary has publicly lashed at 
Romanian and Bulgarian governments, asking them to curb the criminal 
activities of their nationals, as a pre-condition of EU accession. He is 
reported to have mentioned that the re-introduction of visa requirements 
for Romanian and Bulgarian nationals is under consideration. The French 
authorities are also rumoured to contemplate a similar move in the case of 
Romania. Romanian authorities have acted swiftly. The home affairs 
secretary has visited France to engage his counterpart, and a senior official 
from the border police was dispatched to Vienna.  
The numbers involved have declined lately. As Fig 1 shows, Romanian 
emigration peaked in the early 1990s, and registered fairly low flows 
afterwards. The situation is similar in Bulgaria, where another peak was 
recorded during the climax of the political and economic crises – see Fig 2. 
Bulgaria is a particular case because of its large Turkish minority. Many Turks 
fled the country after the fall of communism, since 1989, and most of them 
settled in Turkey. Fig 2 reveals that the Turkish minority represented the bulk 
of migrants the first years after the fall of communism. Leaving aside the 
minorities, both in Romania and Bulgaria migration is a cyclical 
phenomenon, with many migrants returning after a brief spell abroad, 
especially as things settled down in their native country. 
 
Fig. 1. Romanian dwindling migrants  
 
 Total 
population 
Birth rate 
(per ‘000) 
Mortality rate 
(per ‘000) 
Emigrants (number of 
persons) 
1981 22,352,635 17 10  
1985 22,724,836 15.9 10.9  
1989 23,151,564 15.8 10.6  
1990 23,206,720 13.6 10.7 96,929 
1991 23,185,840 11.9 10.9 44,160 
1992 22,788,969 11.5 11.7 31,152 
1993 22,755,260 11.1 11.7 18,446 
1994 22,730,622 10.9 11.7 17,146 
1995 22,680,951 10.4 12 25,675 
1996 22,607,620 10.2 12.7 21,526 
1997 22,545,925 10.5 12.4 19,945 
1998 22,502,803 10.5 12 17,536 
1999 22,458,220 10.4 11.8 12,594 
2000 22,435,205 10.5 11.4 14,753 
2001 22,392,000 9.8 11.6  
Source: INSSE, Romania 
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Fig. 2. Gross migration out of Bulgaria 
 
 Regarding the strong public opinion reaction in EU member states in spite 
of the relatively low numbers of immigrants, several explanations can be 
outlined. Firstly, the migration flows are not distributed equally, some 
countries being disproportionately affected. Among the EU member states, 
Austria bears the largest burden and Germany has the highest absolute 
number of CEE migrants7. This situation can be explained by proximity 
(Austria and Germany are the closest Member Sates for most of the CEE 
applicants), size (Germany) and wealth of their economies which seem to 
offer opportunities to prospective migrants. Apart from these easy targets, 
few other member states receive a disproportionately high influx of 
Bulgarian and Romanian migrants: Greece, the only member state 
bordering Bulgaria, and the Latin countries (Spain, Italy, France, to and a 
lesser degree Portugal) targeted especially by Romanians, due to the 
cultural affinities.  
A second cause of the public outrage is the general EU-wide anti-
immigration trend. The process was recently substantiated by anti-migrant  
outbursts led by extreme-right parties in Austria, France, Netherlands, or UK. 
In this context even centrist parties expressed views against immigration 
(e.g. Denmark). Public opinion trend, combined with highly visible crimes, 
associated with minorities such as the Roma, make a powerful political 
cocktail.  
Aware of the gravity of the situation, the Romanian government put 
considerable effort into mitigating illegal migration. Romania had been 
severely criticized on justice and home affairs in the 1997 Report of the 
European Commission. Since then, much progress has been achieved. 
Romania transposed into domestic legislation practically the whole relevant 
acquis communautaire. Even so, the 2002 report found serious deficiencies 
in the implementation of these regulations. The issue of administrative 
                                                                          
7 Migration models also predict these two states will receive about half of the CEE 
migrants after accession. Source: European Union enlargement. Effects on the 
Spanish economy, Carmela Martin, Jose A. Herce, Simon Sosvilla, - Rivero, Francisco 
J. Velazquez, 2002 
 
 
 
 General population Bulgarian Turks 
1989 218,000 218,000 
1990 85,000 71,195 
1991 45,000 32,164 
1992 65,000 23,490 
1993 54,000  
1994 64,000  
1995 54,000  
1996 66,000  
1997 44,000  
1998 52,000  
Total  344,849 
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capacity returns as a familiar shortcomings of Romania’s compliance with 
acquis requirements in a number of fields.   
Romania takes back all illegal migrants expelled by EU member states. They 
are banned from travelling abroad and in some cases even prosecuted. 
On the prevention side, Romanians willing to travel to EU are required to 
show they have the means to support themselves while in EU, and to pay for 
the return journey. At least considering the data available, these policies 
were successful: in 2002 the total number of people returned from the 
border doubled compared to 2001, while the number of persons expelled 
from EU to Romania declined (Fig. 3). The Romanian government is 
planning to further strengthen these rules.    
Fig. 3.  The fist 10 countries returning Romanians (1st Jan-31st May) 
Top10 countries 2001 2002 
Italy 638 1,056 
Hungary 2,789 526 
Germany 1,357 492 
Spain 149 315 
France 448 274 
Belgium 220 253 
Austria 378 173 
Greece 501 136 
Swede 14 38 
Czech Republic 163 30 
Total 6,657 3,293 
Source: General Inspectorate of Border Police, Public Relations Division; August 2002 
 
After accession 
The key question to tackle is the trend in migration flows once Bulgaria and 
Romania joined the EU and all the travel restrictions ceased. Opinion polls 
suggest the migration potential is rather high. Around 3% of the CEE citizens 
are expected to migrate to the EU-15, mostly to Germany. However, half of 
them are likely to return to their native countries over the medium term. 
While the overall number of migrants can be considerable the pressure is 
expected to be manageable. 
Migration models show that key variables in determining the volume of the 
migration flow are the income differential between the country of origin 
and the country of destination, and proximity. Romania and Bulgaria are 
the poorest CEE accession countries. Thus, the migration pressure will be 
stronger than the CEE average. A mitigating factor is the geographic 
distance between Romania, and especially Bulgaria, and the rich EU 
members. Neither Romania, nor Bulgaria borders any of the core EU states. 
Also, in Romania, even after the abolishion of visa requirements, the 
percentage of people planning to find work in EU remained constant at 16-
17% of adults. Of this number, only 5% acted on their intention, which 
represents the rate of labor force migration after 19908. A specific Romanian 
feature – the cultural connection with the Latin EU – countries might spur 
                                                                          
8 Romania, Annual Early Warning Report, 2003, Romanian Academic Society, 
http://www.sar.org.ro  
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“Brains” can 
emigrate easily 
anyway, and 
not necessarily 
to EU. If 
anything, 
enlargement 
may create 
conditions for 
them to stay 
home  
towards these the Romanian migration out-flow. Greece, the only current 
member state bordering Bulgaria, already receives a large share of the 
Bulgarian migrants.   
The issue of brain drain  
The Romanian and Bulgarian opinion leaders fear that the accession to EU 
and liberalization of the movement of labour will result in an exodus of the 
well qualified elites. This brain drain is largely believed to be an impediment 
to development in the respective countries, but the evidence is mixed in this 
respect. Partly confirming the brain drain scenario are opinion polls in 
Bulgaria showing that people most likely to emigrate are rather young (18-
29 years old), better educated (high school or university graduates), but 
single and unemployed.  
However, there are a number of qualifications to be made. First of all, this 
phenomenon is already taking place, even without accession. German 
statistics have shown that CEE migrants are relatively well educated, with 
higher education attainment at least similar with either their national 
average, or that of the host country. These findings were also confirmed in 
other EU member states, for example in Spain. The difference is that the 
current labor market restrictions are forcing them to accept jobs below their 
qualifications.  
Secondly, both Romania, but especially Bulgaria have a large number of 
educated people. The rate of participation in higher education is about the 
European average in Romania, and one of the highest in Bulgaria – see Fig 
4. The economies of Romania and Bulgaria struggle to involve them all in 
the labor market, still many of these people are unemployed, or, more 
frequently, underemployed. Thus, even with strong migration of the 
educated elite, both Romania and especially Bulgaria will be able to cope.  
Fig. 4.  Share of the labour force with tertiary education (%)  
 Last available data 
Austria 8.6 
Bulgaria 19.3 
Croatia 13.8 
Czech Rep. 10.7 
Greece 22.9 
Hungary 13.9 
Poland 14.0 
Romania 12.4 
Slovakia 11.7 
Slovenia 14.1 
Data source: World Bank 2000, 2001.  
Finally, brain drain does not necessarily have only negative effects. In some 
respects, Romania, and especially Bulgaria, over-produce college 
graduates, if we take into account the level of development in the two 
countries (expressed in PPP GDP). Allowing these people to emigrate could 
be beneficial for their careers and also for the national economies which 
can compensate for the investment in education through remittances. 
Remittances are already an important source for funding the current 
account deficit in Romania (larger than foreign investment) – Fig 5. Similar 
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data for Bulgaria indicates in 1998 remittances of 230 million USD, 
representing 3.8% of imports – these numbers, while considerable, are 
probably underestimated since the difficulties experienced at the time by 
the Bulgarian banking system encouraged people to rely on unrecorded 
cash transfers. Estimates of the National Bank of Romania for 2002 indicate 
about 2 billion dollars in remittances that have entered in this year alone. 
Fig. 5. Remittances, volume and relevance, in the Romanian economy, 
20009  
Total, mil. USD % GDP % exports % imports % FDI 
inflows 
% foreign 
reserves* 
1074 3.37% 10.36% 8.91% 100.8% 44.3% 
*gold reserves not included  
  
Transit countries 
The most challenging consequence of EU expansion for Bulgaria and 
Romania will be their new status as gatekeepers of the Union. Once the 10 
CEE new members will formally join EU in May 2004, Romania will become 
the immediate neighbor of the Union to control the flood of illegal 
emigrants trying to enter the EU space. Romania is actually at the 
crossroads of two major trafficking routes: one starting in Russia, Moldova, 
Ukraine, Romania, and then towards EU; the other is the southern route, 
coming from Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, and EU. Failing to carry out this task 
would have dire consequences for Romania. The direct costs could be very 
high and its chances for accession to EU affected. The new EU approach 
proposed by the Italian presidency, is to expel illegal emigrants / rejected 
asylum seekers to the country of origin or to the last safe country passed on 
the way to the Union. After May 2004, this last safe country will be Romania.  
The responsibility will be even higher after Romania’s eventual accession, 
and liberalization of the movement of people. The Union has taken 
precautionary measures by requesting a five-year transition period for the 
free movement of persons. The Romanian government has heavily invested 
in up-grading the Eastern border and acquiring new surveillance 
equipment. Romania has introduced or is about to introduce visa 
requirements for Turkey and Yugoslavia. Despite special historical ties, at the 
moment of accession visa will be required even for Moldavians. The 
National Office for Refugees underwent a process of institutional 
consolidation. Fig 6 outlines that these measures brought results, with the 
number of foreigners denied entrance to Romania increasing. However, the 
capacity of border police and the issue of corruption are not yet resolved. 
Reportedly, the challenge is similar in Bulgaria.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                          
9 Dăianu et all:, Losers and winners in the process of EU integration. A look at 
Romania ; Working Paper no 27/2001; RCEP 
P O L I C Y  W A R N I N G  R E P O R T  −  O C T  2 0 0 3  
 
 
39 
Fig. 6. Foreigners Not Allowed for Crossing In (NACIs) 
Top 10 countries NACI 
(1st Jan–31st May) 
2001 2002 
R. Moldova 16,308 16,514 
Hungary 6,534 8,576 
Ukraine 2,577 2,532 
Bulgaria 685 2131 
Turkey 592 1,204 
Yugoslavia 296 643 
Germany 98 262 
Italy 106 198 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 25 178 
Russian Federation 110 100 
Total 27,331 32,338 
Source: General Inspectorate of Border Police, Public Relations Division; August 2002 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
If Romania and Bulgaria are judged in a broader time perspective both 
countries have over-performed, not under-performed, during this transition. 
Their communist legacy was the worst; Romania’s exit path from 
Communism, ambiguous and violent, was by all standards a bad omen for 
the development of a democracy. But democracy did develop in 
Romania, which enjoys a lively and self-assertive civil society, with media 
and NGOs struggling for a culture of transparency. The recent resignations 
of powerful ministers accused of corruption solely by the Romanian civil 
society shows that accountability works in the country, that Romania is able 
to handle its own problems.  
The main problem of Romania under the current government, unlike 
Bulgaria, is that the most important drive of change is still foreign pressure. 
The main agents of change in Romania continue to be IMF, World Bank and 
the European Commission. As this report shows in the fields of judiciary and 
administrative reform, there is practically no government will to improve 
radically these sectors where conditionality is hard to monitor and enforce. 
More determination is clear in the macroeconomic policies, where the 
Ministry of Finance does function as an active actor for change. 
Unfortunately, as it showed in the case of fiscal reform, there was not 
enough political support in the government party to back up the good 
policies of one Ministry.   
The year ahead is a challenging one on two accounts: it is the last year of 
EU negotiations, and there are also domestic elections. More support is 
needed from the government party for the new team empowered to act 
on EU accession, the goal which should subordinate all others in the next 
years. This means restructuring the government following the EU country 
report to increase speed and solve backlogs.  
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE ROMANIAN GOVERNMENT 
GENERAL 
? The house should be cleared in a more timely manner next time. The 
lagging of Puwak and Beuran scandals in the media has hurt not only 
the government, but Romania’s image abroad and EU accession. The 
press, including foreign press, had reported negatively for years on the 
General Secretary of government, Şerban Mihăilescu. These resignations 
come late, after a lot of damage was done. As SAR has recommended 
last summer (2002) a restructuring of the government should have taken 
place then, before the PM went public defending the dubious characters 
in his government and pledging he will not let them go. The cost paid by 
the PM is higher now than it would have been a year ago. 
? The ministers whose sectors come out as laggards from the EC country 
report should also resign and be replaced with people who can prompt 
real change in the process. Especially in the field of JUSTICE the delay is 
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serious, and the will to democratize the system is shaky. A change is 
badly needed. But the eventual successor as Justice Minister will also 
need more backup if things are to improve. There is also resistance to 
reform in the Parliament, and all the will of the government party needs 
being summoned to push this reform through. 
? Empower the new Minister of European Integration and grant him more 
authority over other ministers. The way to improve policy cohesion is to 
locate it in the Ministry of European Integration.  
JUDICIARY 
? Make public the draft law on the Superior Council of Magistrates and 
discuss it openly with international donors and Romanian civil society. 
Accept the democratization of elections for the positions of judges 
members of the Council.  
? Give up all pending extraordinary appeals in property-related cases 
and pull out from the property related trials at ECHR. Better act elegantly 
and timely than lose all the trials as the Romanian state has done so far. 
Live up to the spirit of the new Constitution just passed and restore 
property to owners.  
? Give up the extra-ordinary appeal in criminal procedure. Restore the 
authority of the Supreme Court of Justice this way, or no constitutional 
reform can help. 
HOME AFFAIRS AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
? Prepare for the first elections with over one million Romanians abroad, 
and perhaps two millions. Improve communication with the migrants’ 
community. 
? Continue to act to strengthen borders and be more self-assertive and 
professional in selling the good performances in this respect to the 
national and international media. 
TO INTERNATIONAL DONORS 
? As the recent resignation of three ministers showed, the real drive for 
change in Romania is Romania’s public opinion. Make all the 
commitments of the Romanian government, including diagnoses, 
recommendations and deadlines, public. This will foster both 
accountability and performance as the public opinion will monitor them 
for you. 
TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
? Consider granting the status of functional market economy to Romania 
sooner rather than later. In the same time improve control over spending 
of European funds in Romania and exercise strong conditionality 
regarding the cleaning of the Romanian economy of political 
entrepreneurs. Make European companies a less reluctant ally in the 
process, as far too often they still engage in unholy alliances to 
penetrate the Romanian market.  
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